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I
INTRODUCTION

There can no longer be any question that Europe has gained the attention
of U.S. business. Many of the largest and best known U.S. companies,
including such household names as Hewlett-Packard, Phillip Morris, and
AT&T, are increasingly looking to Europe as their largest potential growth
market in the 1990s.1 Perhaps even more significantly, the drive to expand
sales and operations within Europe has been especially great among the
fastest growing companies in the United States. For example, of the twenty
Silicon Valley companies recently named to Fortune magazine's list of
America's 100 fastest growing companies, more than half receive between
one-third and one-half of their revenues from international operations.
Moreover, many of these companies (and their competitors) claim that
international operations, particularly revenues in Europe, represent the best
opportunity for growth in the decade ahead.
The drive to expand in Europe has been spurred, at least in part, by the
European Community's ("EC") proposed unification by the end of 1992.
U.S. companies are well aware of the "carrot and stick" contained within the
unification program: a company that enters any EC country prior to 1993
obtains barrier-free access to the world's single largest market, containing
more than 340 million consumers, and to one of the world's wealthiest and
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best-educated work forces. A company that fails to enter prior to January 1,
1993 risks being excluded from this "fortress Europe," which will impose
prohibitive tariffs on products created outside the single market.
Expanding beyond the familiar domestic market entails significant and
often unpredictable risks for a company, particularly small or medium-sized
companies. Often, such companies find that a significant portion of both their
financial and management resources are spent in determining how to enter,
rather than how to succeed in the foreign market. Obtaining local expertise
and gaining customers who have traditionally relied on local vendors or have
historical, linguistic, and cultural ties with local companies can create
obstacles, even for companies with superior products.
In an effort to overcome some of these obstacles, many non-European
companies seeking to enter or expand operations in the EC consider
acquiring or entering into a joint venture with an already established
European company, rather than attempting to enter alone. In addition,
industry consolidation in the EC remains significantly below U.S. levels,
yielding a large number of potential acquisition partners for companies
looking to enter or expand in the EC market.
These attitudes have led, in part, to an explosion of cross-border merger
and acquisition activity within the EC, notwithstanding the overall worldwide
decline in such activity. Cross-border mergers and acquisition activity in the
EC reached a new high in 1990-approximately 1500 transactions, with an
aggregate value of over $62 billion, an increase of more than fifteen percent
over 1989-despite the very difficult market for merger and acquisition
activity throughout the world. 2 Particularly noteworthy was the activity of
Swedish companies, which were the second most active in terms of deal value
and number of transactions; ninety-nine percent of Sweden's total
expenditures on mergers and acquisitions went to EC-based targets,
demonstrating the determination of companies in this European Free Trade
3
Association ("EFTA") member country to obtain access to the EC market.
Yet, foreign buyers looking to enter the EC market through acquisition
continue to face a substantial regulatory burden. While the drive to a single
market has led to technical uniformity in a large number of areas, significant
differences continue to exist among the EC countries' corporate regulations,
particularly regulations governing acquisitions of companies. The EC's
attempt to unify takeover regulation within the Community through adoption
of a "takeover directive ' 4 appears to be failing, further emphasizing the
2. Holmes, Mergers & Acquisitions at 7-8 (cited in note 1).
3. Id.
4. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and
Other General Bids, 1990 OJ (C 64) 8 ("Takeover Directive"). The Takeover Directive has been the
subject of considerable debate within the EC. For an analysis of the Takeover Directive, as well as a
review of recent amendments to it, see David J. Berger, The Second Common Market: Development of a
Unified Standardfor Reviewing the Actions of Target Directors in the United States and the European Community,
9 Intl Tax & Bus L 1 (1991).
The Takeover Directive is currently under review by the EC's member states. The Netherlands,
which holds the EC presidency until the end of 1991, has been among the strongest opponents of the
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substantial differences existing between EC countries, both on the merits of
takeovers and the proper methods for regulating and limiting takeover
abuses. Further, the written regulations of individual EC countries are often
less important than the custom and practice within the country, or the
philosophy underlying the regulatory system. The importance of local
customs and relationships is particularly true where the regulations have only
recently been enacted in response to EC directives, and in countries such as
5
Germany or Spain that have rarely seen domestic takeovers.
This article seeks to disperse some of the regulatory haze created by the
various philosophies of corporate governance within the EC. Understanding
the different systems of takeover regulation within the European countries
before attempting an acquisition can provide a company with more than just
important technical knowledge about the requirements of an acquisition;
often, such understanding provides insight into pertinent cultural and
historical factors of the particular country, which can assist an acquiror both in
determining how to choose a particular target, and in conducting
negotiations. Takeover regulation does not grow in a vacuum; the method by
which a country decides for regulating corporate acquisitions frequently
explains a great deal about how corporations function within the country, and
how the broader process is viewed.
This article summarizes, in Parts II, III, and IV, respectively, the mergers
and acquisition processes in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. This
summary includes not only the regulatory systems affecting an acquisition, but
also the corporate, financial, and market factors that in many European
countries are more significant than the actual regulatory regime. 6
This article focuses on these three countries for several reasons. First, the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany have by far the largest economies and
stock exchanges, as well as the most active takeover markets in the EC.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the debate now occurring over EC
takeover regulations mirrors the decisions made in these three countries
since, in many respects, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are
examples of the three different systems of takeover regulation now in place
within the EC.
Takeover Directive, making it unlikely that any new action on the Directive will occur before January
1992, when Portugal assumes the EC presidency.
5. Recent studies by the consulting firms Booz-Allen and Coopers & Lybrand have
demonstrated substantial structural and legal obstacles to cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
See Booz-Allen Acquisition Services, Study on Obstacles To Takeover Bids In the European Community
(1989); Coopers & Lybrand, Bamiers To Takeovers In The European Community (Her Maj Stationery
Office, 1989) (a study) ("Barriers");see also DavidJ. Berger, The European Markets Try To Coordinate,
Unify Conflicting Merger Law, Nati LJ S14 col 1 (Nov 6, 1989) (discussing studies and structural and
legal obstacles to takeovers).
6. This article will not discuss the EC's proposed Takeover Directive, or the likelihood that the
Takeover Directive will be adopted. The author has previously analyzed in detail the original and
amended versions of the Takeover Directive. See Berger, 9 Intl Tax & Bus L 1 (cited in note 4)
(discussing current status of directive); DavidJ. Berger, Exporting the Twin Towers: The Development of a
Transnational Business Judgment Rule, 9 SLU Pub L Rev 169 (1990) (analyzing original version of the
proposed directive and its potential impact).
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Thus, the United Kingdom, with its highly developed takeover market, has
a history of significant regulation, albeit regulation generally created and
enforced by non-statutory bodies such as the Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers. This system is roughly comparable to that currently in place in
Ireland, and is looked upon favorably by those seeking to create or allow an
active takeover market within the EC.
France, which has traditionally had little takeover activity, is one of several
countries, including Spain, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Denmark, that have
recently introduced or enacted new takeover legislation in connection with an
anticipated increase in takeovers after 1992. While these new regulations are,
in general, similar in substance to regulations in the United Kingdom, the

regulations are statute-based and thus are enforceable in the courts.
The third group, led by Germany but also including the Netherlands and,
to a lesser degree, Denmark and Norway (as well as such non-EC European
countries as Sweden and Switzerland), has used market and cultural forces to
virtually eliminate hostile takeovers. Accordingly, codified or even selfregulatory rules governing takeover activities are limited in scope and
generally of less significance. Additionally, the overwhelming number of
transactions are consensual, and shareholder concerns are considered to be of
secondary importance.
In sum, a better understanding of the takeover regulatory system in these
three countries may provide insight into the types of takeover regulations that
the EC is likely to adopt over the next several years.
II
THE U. K. METHOD OF TAKEOVER REGULATION:
NON-STATUTORY

A SYSTEM OF

REGULATION

Britain has long had the most active takeover market in the EC, as well as a
widely respected system for regulating change-of-control transactions.
Despite the recent worldwide decline in takeovers, which has also occurred in

the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom remains by far the largest takeover
market in Europe. Indeed, during the fall and winter of 1991, a number of
transactions, including large bids by Hanson for Beazer, BTR for Hawker
Siddeley, and Abbey National for Scottish Mutual, have again placed Britain
in the forefront of the worldwide merger and acquisition market. 7
The British system is widely referred to as a "non-statutory" system,
emphasizing self-regulation by the securities industry rather than particular
legal penalties for violations of specific laws. 8 This view should not be
7. For an analysis of these three bids, see Return of the Takeover, The Economist 19-20 (Sept 28,
1991); Merger, Mystery, Suspense, The Economist 71-72 (Sept 28, 1991).
8. A number of articles have compared and contrasted the takeover regimes in the United
Kingdom and the United States. See, for example, Thomas Hurst, The Regulation of Tender Offers in the
United States and the United Kingdom: Self-Regulation Versus Legal Regulation, 12 NC J Intl L Comm Reg
389 (1987); Tony Shea, Regulation of Takeovers in the United Kingdom, 16 Brooklyn J Intl L 89 (1990);
Deborah A. DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons From the British, 58 NYU L Rev 45
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overstated; the U.K. system, based upon the joint cooperation of all the major
domestic financial and legal institutions, exacts significant penalties for failure
to comply. The penalties are frequently imposed on both the takeover
professionals advising and assisting in transactions as well as the principal.
A.

Pre-Bid Analysis and Disclosures Required Prior to the Offer

Two preliminary issues a potential acquiror faces are the availability of
information about the target prior to the time the bid is made or the target is
approached, and the ability of the bidder to acquire shares of the target prior
to disclosing its intent to make an offer.
In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, a significant amount of
reliable financial information must be disclosed by a publicly-listed company.
For example, all companies with share capital must file an annual report
containing certain specified financial information, as well as an annual profit
and loss statement and balance sheet, which must disclose additional detailed
financial information. 9 All of this financial information must be audited by the
company's independent auditors, who must state that the company's accounts
have been properly prepared and present a "true and fair view" of the
company's finAncial position.' 0 In addition, a company whose shares are
traded on the stock exchange has a continuing obligation to update prior
disclosures and explain any material differences between their results and
those contained in any forecast published by the company.'I This extensive
pool of data allows a potential acquiror to obtain a significant amount of
information prior to approaching a target company.
An acquiror may also purchase up to three percent of a public company's
issued share capital carrying voting rights before making any disclosures.
Once the three percent level is reached, the purchaser must disclose this
information within two business days and make additional disclosures
whenever the stake is increased by one percentage point.' 2 Any person
(1983). In general, these articles look quite favorably upon the British system, particularly praising it
for avoiding tactical litigation and for its fairness to minority shareholders.
9. See Companies Act 1985 ("1985 Companies Act") at §§ 220-40, 363-65, and Schedules 4,
5, and 15 (detailing the list of items that must be disclosed and how to maintain records).
10. The principle of "true and fair view" and an explanation of the meaning of this term are
contained in the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice ("SSAP"), the basic accounting standard
in the United Kingdom.
11. The disclosure obligations for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are
contained in the Stock Exchange Rules For Admission of Securities to Listing, which is commonly
referred to as the "Yellow Book" because of its yellow binder. For a detailed listing of the additional
disclosure obligations for a public company, see Yellow Book § 5 ch 1 (1984). See generally A
Practitioner's Guide To The Stock Exchange Yellow Book (Westminster Management Consultants Ltd.,
1991).
12. 1985 Companies Act § 198. Section 201 further empowers the Secretary of State to alter the
three percent level by regulation, affirmed by Parliament, when appropriate. It was this provision
that was used to reduce the threshold level of ownership requiring disclosure from five percent to
three percent in 1990.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. 4

"acting in concert" with the purchaser for the purpose of "acquiring an
interest" in the target's shares must also make the required disclosures.1 3
A bidder may face another significant potential disclosure obligation in the
United Kingdom. U.K. corporate law provides that a public company may
compel a shareholder to disclose information concerning any level of
ownership when the company knows or has reason to believe that the
shareholder owns or has an interest in the target's shares prior to the date of
14
the disclosure demand.
The United Kingdom also imposes strict limitations on the ability of a
bidder, prior to the time an offer is made, to increase his or her ownership of
voting securities above fifteen percent. The limitations are set forth in the
Rules Governing Substantial Acquisition of Shares ("SARs"), which are
issued and administered by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ("Takeover
Panel"), and are published as part of the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers ("Takeover Code"). 15 Simply stated, the SARs prohibit any person
from acquiring, in any seven day period, shares carrying ten percent or more
of the voting rights of a company if the acquisition, when added with any
existing holding, would give the acquiror between fifteen percent and thirty
percent of the company's voting securities. 16 The SARs further require
disclosure to both the stock exchange and the target company upon the
acquisition of fifteen percent of a company's voting rights, as well as any
subsequent acquisition that increases the ownership level by one percentage
point. 17

B.

Methods for Making, Accepting, and Rejecting an Offer-The Takeover
Code

The Takeover Code governs the making of a public offer in the United
Kingdom. The Code consists of ten "General Principles" and thirty-eight
specific "Rules," which are applicable to all offers. The Takeover Code
further provides that it is "impracticable to devise rules in sufficient detail to
cover all circumstances which can arise in offers. Accordingly, persons
engaged in offers should be aware that the spirit as well as the precise wording
of the General Principals and the ensuing Rules must be observed."'"
13. 1985 Companies Act §§ 204-07. See generally Geoffrey K. Morse, Charlesworth 's Company
Law 254-61 (Stevens, 13th ed 1987) (discussing cases and definition of "acting in concert").
14. 1985 Companies Act at § 212. In addition, shareholders may compel the company to
investigate and report on any shareholder owning ten percent or more of a company's equity.
15. The SARs were introduced in 1981 to restrict the so-called "dawn raids," when substantial
acquisitions of shares were made from large shareholders prior to the time small shareholders could
sell their shares.
16. SARs Rule 1. The actions of a shareholder owning more than 30% of a company's voting
securities are regulated by the Takeover Code.
17. Id at Rules 2-3.
18. Takeover Code, GP 1. The Panel has decided that there can be a breach of the Takeover
Code without a violation of any specific provision. See, for example, Panel Statement, Johnson & Firth
Brown Ltd. v. Dunford & Elliot Ltd., 1977 J Bus L 161; see generally Geoffrey K. Morse, United
Kingdom, in Harold Bloomenthal, ed, International Capital Markets and Securities Regulation §§ 6.01-.04
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1991).
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1. Timing of the Offer. The Takeover Code requires that all offers initially be
kept open for at least twenty-one days. If there is an increase in offering price
or another material change, the offer must be kept open for at least an
additional fourteen days.' 9 Offers are generally conditioned upon the bidder
obtaining at least fifty percent of the target's voting rights; this condition must
be satisfied within sixty days of the date on which the initial offer was made. If
this condition is not satisfied, the offer must expire, and the bidder (as well as
anyone acting in concert with the bidder) is prohibited from making a new
20
offer within twelve months of the expiration of the original offer.
2. Price Considerations and Bidding Structures. The Takeover Code contains
significant rules concerning the pricing and structure of a bid. For example,
the initial offering must be a price equal to or higher than the highest price
paid by the bidder for any of the target's shares purchased in the prior three
months. 2 1 If the bidder acquires shares in the target during the pendency of
the offer at a price higher than the offering price, then it must both
immediately disclose the terms of the transaction and increase the offering
price to equal or exceed that paid in the transaction. 2 2 If the bidder has
acquired more than ten percent of the target's voting securities in the twelve
months prior to making the offer, the offer must include a cash alternative at a
price equal to or greater than the highest price paid by the bidder. 23
In sharp contrast to the provisions of the Williams Act in the United
States, the Takeover Code also contains a mandatory offer provision and
generally prohibits partial bids. The mandatory bid rule requires any person
who acquires more than thirty percent of a target's voting securities to make
an offer for all of the voting shares of the target. 24 The offer must be
unconditional, except that the bid may be conditioned upon the offeror
receiving fifty percent or more of the target's stock in the offer. 25 A bid for
more than fifty percent, but less than all, of the target's shares may only be
made with the Takeover Panel's consent. The Panel has indicated that it will
not normally give consent. 2 6 In addition, any offer that could result in the
bidder owning between thirty percent and fifty percent of the target's voting

19. Takeover Code Rule 31.
20. Id at Rule 35. Offers are also required to lapse if the offer is referred on antitrust grounds to
the Monopolies and Merger Commission ("MMC") or if the EC issues a decision under Article 8 of
the EC merger regulation. A new offer, however, may be made within 21 days following clearance
from these authorities. See id at Rules 12, 35.
21. Id at Rule 6.
22. Id.
23. Id at Rule 11. See also Panel Statement, Hillsdown Holdings plc. v S. & W. Beresford plc.,
1986J Bus L 407 (the Panel has discretion to waive this provision where appropriate).
24. Takeover Code Rule 9. The "acting in concert" provision of this Rule has been the subject
of particular controversy and is the subject of approximately eight pages of commentary to the Rule.
25. Id. A mandatory offer must be in cash or accompanied by a cash alternative at a price not
less than the highest price paid during the preceding 12 month period by the bidder. Id.
26. Id at Rule 36.
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stock must be conditioned on the approval of stockholders representing a
27
majority of the remaining voting shares.
The Takeover Code also places far more severe limitations on an offeror
than does the Williams Act in the United States. In particular, the Takeover
Code requires that an offeror should announce an offer only where the offeror
believes it will be able to implement the offer in full. In a cash offer, this
means that the offeror should have the cash available at the time the offer is
made. 28 Where the financing is being provided through a loan, the loan must
not be subject to significant conditions, and the conditions must all be
disclosed in the offer document.
3. Duties and Obligations of the Target Board. The Takeover Code places a
number of restrictions on the ability of a target board to frustrate a bid. In
particular, the board is prohibited from taking any action "during the course
of an offer, or even before the date of the offer, if the board ... has reason to
believe" that the action could frustrate, deter, or otherwise prevent the
target's shareholders from receiving the offer. 29 Rule 21 specifically prohibits
the target board from issuing new shares, selling assets, or entering into a
contract (other than in the ordinary course of business) when an offer is
"imminent." In addition, the Takeover Code provides that if the target board
provides information to one bidder, it must provide the same information to
30
all bidders.
There has been extensive litigation to define the scope of the prohibition
on director conduct. For example, in connection with recent bids by Minorco
for Consolidated Gold Fields and Hoylake for BAT Industries, the Panel
sharply limited the ability of a target board to commence regulatory or legal
actions against the alleged illegal activity of the acquiror. 31 As a result of
rulings by the Takeover Panel in these offers, it is now clear that litigation by
the target against the bidder will be considered a violation of the Takeover
32
Code.

27. Id.
28. In contrast, the Williams Act does not require that a bidder have financing arranged prior to,
or even after, an offer is Announced. See, e.g., IU International Corp. v NX Acquisition Corp., 840 F2d
220, 221 (4th Cir), aff'd per curiam, 840 F2d 229 (4th Cir 1988) (en banc) (Williams Act does not
require a bidder to have financing in place prior to completion of offer); Newmont Mining Corp. v
Pickens, 831 F2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir 1987) (same).
29. Takeover Code Rule 21; see also id at GP 7.
30. This provision inhibits the ability of a potential acquiror, even in a negotiated, friendly
transaction, from obtaining access to certain information which would typically be available in similar
circumstances in the United States. Id at Rule 20. This provision takes on special importance in the
case of management buy-outs. Id.
31. See Panel Statement Minorco plc. v. Consolidated Gold Fields plc. May 9, 1989; Appeal
Committee Statement on Hoylake Investment Ltd. v. BAT Industries plc., Sept 29, 1989.
32. See id. A target may, however, lobby government in an attempt to defeat the offer. See
generally John K. Grieves, Take-over Regulation in the United Kingdom: An Introduction, in Takeovers:
Operating in the New Environment 277-80 (ALI-ABA, 1990).
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Future Trends

Underlying the United Kingdom's Takeover Code is a philosophy of
substantive fairness to all participants, including the bidder, the target, the
target's shareholders, and even the public. The Code attempts to meet this
goal by closely regulating the market for corporate control. Accordingly,
there are high barriers to entering the market including, as described above,
strict limitations upon the conditions an offer may have, the length of time the
offer may be extended, and the ability of an offeror to acquire a significant
minority interest at the expense of small shareholders. Similarly, the United
Kingdom prohibits many defensive actions by target management, including
unduly favoring one bidder over another.
One effect of these regulations is to limit the number of participants who
can gain control of companies in the United Kingdom. For example, it is
highly unlikely that many of the financial entrepreneurs who participated in
the U.S. takeover market in the 1980s could have played the same role in the
United Kingdom. More generally, it is difficult to effect a successful highlyleveraged offer in the United Kingdom, and it is not possible to make an offer
33
conditional upon obtaining financing.
The U.K. regulatory system also limits the types of acquisitions that can
occur. For example, the '"unk-bond," highly-leveraged deals that were
popular in the United States in the late 1980s were never successful in the
United Kingdom.3 4 As a result, the United Kingdom did not experience the
many large bankruptcies that occurred in the United States following some of
35
these transactions.
The strengths of the U.K. system-in particular its ability to allow an active
takeover market while limiting the perceived financial and legal abuses
resulting from the U.S. regulatory system-have led many European
observers to view the U.K. system as a model. Accordingly, the U. K. takeover
rules have, in many respects, formed the theoretical basis for much of the
EC's proposed takeover regulation. In particular, the substantive rules
regarding disclosure, mandatory bids, and the role of target directors, which
are contained in the most recent draft of the EC's proposed Takeover
Directive, are very similar to those contained in the Takeover Code.
At least one important difference remains, however, between the Takeover
Code and the proposed Takeover Directive (and the Williams Act): the
Takeover Code is the only regulatory system not based on statute, and whose
rules are enforced by self-regulatory organizations rather than in the courts.
It is not clear whether this self-regulatory system, despite its strong support
33. Perhaps the most noteworthy of the U.S.-style leveraged deals in Europe was Sir James
Goldsmith's bid for B.A.T. Industries plc. See Richard A. Meichner, Nothing Is Sacred, No One Is Too
Big, Business Week 44 (July 31, 1989). Goldsmith's bid eventually failed.
34. Id. See also Appeal Committee Statement on Hoylake Investment Ltd v B.A. T. Industries, plc.
(Sept 29, 1989).
35. For a recent analysis of the problems that could occur with leveraged transactions, see Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland v Pathe Communications Corp., CA No 12150 (Del Chanc 1991) (Allen, Ch)
(analyzing the failed buyout of MGM by Giancarlo Paretti).
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within the United Kingdom and among many who have been involved with or
analyzed the U.K. system, can be maintained when virtually every other EC
country insists upon a system of statutory regulation, and a public,
governmental organization to enforce these regulations.
III
FRANCE:

A

PARADIGM FOR

EC

TAKEOVER REGULATION?

Over the last several years, France has developed one of the EC's most
active takeover markets, as well as the largest stock exchange on the European
continent. The growth of French capital markets resulted in French
companies being the largest cross-border acquirors of EC businesses in both
1989 and 1990, with total purchases in 1990 alone of more than $13 billion. 36
The lengthy list of major French acquirors in 1990 included such well-known
companies as Renault, LVMH, Elf Acquitaine, Credit Lyonnais, and Cie
G~nrale des Eaux. During this same period, the domestic market
capitalization of the Paris stock market ("Bourse") has also grown
considerably, from less than $120 billion in 1987 to more than $190 billion by
7
the end of 1988, and more than $200 billion in 1990.3

France has also undergone a number of substantial changes in its takeover
regulations over the last several years. Perhaps most significant was the
adoption of France's first takeover law, Law No. 89-531 relating to the
Security and Transparence of the Financial Markets ("Law 89-531"), and
subsequent regulations promulgated by the two bodies principally
responsible for overseeing the French securities markets, the Conseil des
Bourses de Valeurs ("CBV") and the Commission des Operations de Bourse
("COB").3 8 As described more fully below, the new regulatory regime grafts
several aspects of the U.K. and U.S. takeover systems onto a continental
European economy with a historical distrust of takeovers. Both the .flurry of
increased takeover activity and the new legal rules governing such activity
have resolved in questions concerning the scope of permitted activities, as
historical relations among shareholders create new obligations as a result of
the new laws. 3 9 The changes are likely to continue in response to both new
36. See Holmes, Mergers & Acquisitions (cited in note 1). See also David J. Berger, Buying Up
Europe in New Buyout Regime, Legal Times 26 col 1 (Feb 4, 1991) (discussing growth of French
companies in international takeovers).
37. David J. Berger, Guidelinesfor Mergers and Acquisitions in France, 11 Nw J Intl L & Bus 484, 487
(1991).
38. Law No 89-531 of August 2, 1989, [1989] JO 4 Aout at 9822 ("Law 89-53 1"). The principal
implementing measures, set forth in the Arretes of Septembre 28, 1989, [1989] JO 30 Septembre at
12,301 and 12,307 ("September 28 Regulations") [1989] JO 1 AoCit at 9,676, include Title V of the
General Regulation of the CBV, and COB Regulation No 89-03 ("Regulation 89-03"). The law was,
in general, upheld by France's constitutional council. See Decision No 89-260DC of the
Constitutional Counsel of July 28, 1989. For a detailed discussion of French Securities Market and
the new laws relating to takeovers, see Berger, 11 Nw J Intl L & Bus at 506-22 (cited in note 37).
39. According to the director of the CBV, this uncertainty and confusion is shared by the
regulators attempting to enforce these new regulations. See David J. Berger, Takeover Activity May
Grow, Natl LJ 23 (Dec 23, 1991).
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EC developments and as French regulators begin enforcing and interpreting
the new rules.
A.

Pre-Bid Analysis and Disclosures Required Prior to the Offer

The disclosure obligations for French companies have increased
significantly over the last several years, and this trend is likely to continue.
French companies listed on a stock exchange must publish annual financial
statements, including profit and loss statements, consolidated financial
statements, and portfolio holdings, within four months of the end of the
company's fiscal year. 40 Public companies must also publish as well as
quarterly unaudited revenue totals for the company and each subsidiary, biannual operating results, which must be reviewed by the company's auditors.
In addition, information concerning the salaries of company's top executives
and any reports of the company's statutory auditors must be disclosed to
41
shareholders.
It is worth noting that at least one authoritative source has questioned the
reliability of the audited accounts of French companies, particularly where the
auditor is not one of the leading international accounting firms. Specifically,
Coopers & Lybrand, in a 1989 report for Britain's Department of Trade and
Industry, noted the following:
In our experience, significant adjustments to the published results and net assets may
need to be made by [a U.K. or U.S.] acquiror to bring French accounts into an
equivalent basis. These adjustments cannot, in general, be qualified without access.
Further independent investigation of the accounts can 4often
bring to light material
2
misstatements .

.

. due to the lack of an adequate audit.

A potential acquiror's disclosure obligations in France may vary according
to a company's charter, the number of shares owned, and the purpose of the
ownership. 43 Thus, a company's charter can require disclosure following the
purchase of as little as 0.5 percent of a company's voting securities; such well
known companies as BSN and LVMH have adopted charter provisions
requiring disclosure at a one percent threshold. To whom, and within what
time, disclosure must be made, may also generally be established in the
charter.
In addition to the particular charter provisions, Law 89-531 requires
various public disclosures of a purchase of voting securities in a French
company at the following levels: five percent; ten percent; twenty percent;
thirty-three percent; fifty percent; and 66.66 percent.4 4 Disclosure to the
40. Berger, II NwJ Intl L & Bus at 494-96 (cited in note 37).
41. Id.
42. Coopers & Lybrand, 2 Barriers at 10 (cited in note 5).
43. Law No 66-537 of July 24, 1966, [1966] JO 26 Juillet at art 356 ("Law 66-537"). The
principal regulations governing French business organizations are contained in Law 66-537 and
Decree No 67-236 of March 23, 1967, [1967] JO 24 Mars at 2843 ("Decree 67-236"). For a
discussion of these two provisions, see Berger, 11 NwJ Intl L & Bus at 488-505 (cited in note 37); see
also George A. Bermann, Henry P. DeVries & Nina M. Galston, French Law-Constitution and Selected
Legislation 24-42 (Transnational Publications, 1990) (partial English translation of the codes).
44. Law 89-531 at art 17.
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company must be made within fifteen days of the acquisition. If the
company's shares are publicly traded, disclosure must be made to the CBV
within five market days. 4 5 Law 89-531 also introduced the "acting in concert"
standard to France, expanding the disclosure requirement to individuals or
groups working for a common purpose.4 6 Substantial civil and/or criminal
penalties may be imposed for failing to comply with the disclosure provisions.
For example, shareholders who fail to comply may have their securities'
voting rights suspended for at least two years after the proper disclosure is
made, plus face potentially significant fines. 4 7
B.

Methods for Avoiding or Deterring an Offer-The Use of Pre-Bid
Defensive Techniques

As discussed in more detail below, a French company's defensive options
after a tender offer is made are now substantially limited. The post-offer
limitations on defensive tactics, though stringent, are not expected to open
the French takeover market dramatically nor make French companies more
vulnerable to hostile acquisition. This is because many French companies,
like their counterparts elsewhere on the continent, have historically relied
upon a variety of defensive measures designed to deter a bid by limiting the
possibility that an offer will succeed.
Among the most common and successful pre-offer defensive techniques is
the use of cross-shareholdings of friendly shareholders to maintain a
substantial portion of a company's equity. For example, Coopers & Lybrand
estimated in 1988 that up to fifty-seven percent of the 200 largest French
companies were controlled by family groups or other select groups of
shareholders; this percentage was found to be even higher for smaller
companies. 4 8 Similarly, in an attempt to protect a number of newly privatized
French companies from unsolicited or hostile bids, the French government
frequently sold a significant block of stock to "hardcore friendly
shareholders" ("noyau dur"). As a result of this policy, it is estimated that as
much as thirty percent of the equity of the largest French companies is owned
by various noyau dur, who are obliged to retain these holdings for a specified
time, and who may only sell their holdings to specified groups of individuals
9
and companies. 4
Another popular defensive technique for French companies is to issue
super voting or non-voting stock. For example, the charters of such major
French companies as Piper-Heidseck, Peugeot, and LVMH all provide that
45. Id at art 18.
46. Id at art 17. The "acting in concert" standard has been an issue of considerable controversy
following the CBV's recent ruling that Bollore was acting in concert with Clinvest and El Rabha to
acquire the French shipping company Delmas-Vieljeux. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
47. Law 89-531 at art 20.
48. Coopers & Lybrand, Barriers at 15 (cited in note 5).
49. Id. For a more detailed discussion concerning the effectiveness of the noyau dur policy and its
implications, see Berger, 11 Nw J Intl L & Bus at 502-04 (cited in note 37); see also Bertrand
Jacquillat, Nationalizationand Privatization in Contemporary France, 1987 Govt Union Rev 21.
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long-term shareholders have additional voting rights.5 0 It is also possible,
although officially discouraged, for a company to place an absolute limit on
the amount of voting power held by any one shareholder. Thus, PernodRicard prohibits a shareholder from controlling more than thirty percent of
the voting rights of the company, regardless of the number of shares held. 5 '
The extensive use of these and other defensive tactics historically allowed
a small group of shareholders to maintain control of the company, regardless
of the amount of a company's equity they actually owned. This fact led, in
turn, to very few hostile bids since the bid could not succeed in the face of
opposition from the controlling shareholder(s). While this is beginning to
change, a number of the best-known French companies still remain virtually
impregnable to unwanted acquisition because of the equity blocks owned by
friendly shareholders.
C.

Making, Accepting, or Rejecting a Formal Offer

The French rules governing the making of a tender offer, though
appearing reasonably similar to the Takeover Code and the Williams Act, are
in some respects significantly different from both regulatory regimes.
A tender offer commences when the bidder files an application with the
CBV. 52 The application must include the material terms of the transaction
and information on the bidder. 53 Further, application can only be made by
the bidder's banking or financial institution, which must guarantee the
financing arrangements for the offer. 54 The CBV automatically suspends
trading in the target (and the bidder if it is publicly listed) for a minimum of
two days. The CBV must issue a decision concerning the offer within five
business days of its filing. The CBV may require the bidder to revise the
terms of its offer, or even to post sufficient cash and/or securities to guarantee
the financing for the bid. 5 5 At the same time, the bidder must file a draft
prospectus with the COB, which also must respond within five business days.
1. Timing of the Offer and Competing Bids. As under the Williams Act, a tender
offer must remain open for at least twenty days. Competing bids may be
submitted until ten calendar days before the original bid is scheduled to
close. 56 The CBV will then extend the duration of the first offer so that both
offers close at the same time. Competing cash offers must ordinarily be at a
price of at least 102 percent of the prior offer, though no increase is required
when the original offer was a partial offer and the competing bid extends the
50. The statutory authorization for such provisions is Law 66-537 art 175. See generally Berger,
11 NwJ Intl L & Bus at 502-06 (cited in note 37).
51. Id.
52. September 28 Regulations art 5 (cited in note 38).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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number of shares being sought.5 7 After ten weeks the CBV may set a deadline
for the submission of final bids.
2. Mandatory Tender Offers. Law 89-531 established mandatory tender offers
in France. 5 8 Under the new regulation, an offeror must bid for at least twothirds of the target's outstanding voting stock upon obtaining thirty-three
59
percent of the target's capital shares.
This provision has become highly controversial after the CBV's groundbreaking ruling that Bollore, a French transport and industrial group, was
required to make a tender offer to acquire all of Delmas-Vieljeux, a leading
French shipping company. 60 The ruling was striking because no single
investor had acquired the thirty-three percent necessary to invoke the
mandatory tender offer provision. Nonetheless, the CBV determined that in
acquiring 59.2 percent of Delmas, Bollore had acted in concert with two other
investors, a holding company called El Rabha and Clinvest, the investment
banking subsidiary of state-owned credit Lyonnais, as well as the main
shareholder in El Rabha and Bollore's investment bank. 6 1 Accordingly, the
CBV required Bollore to offer to purchase all of Delmas' outstanding stock, a
decision which cost Bollore more than $200 million. 62
The CBV's ruling in Bollore, as well as a prior ruling in which it required
Galeries Lafayette to make an offer for rival retailer Nouvelles Galeries in a
transaction involving the issue of double voting rights, indicates that the
CBV's interpretation of the new takeover rules will continue to cause
63
considerable uncertainty.
More generally, the CBV's decision also indicates that banks can be
considered to be acting in concert with their clients. 64 This position will have
a substantial impact on the way French banks and companies conduct their
business for several reasons. The rules will affect the French banks' historical
57. Id.
58. For a discussion of the circumstances giving rise to the adoption of mandatory tender offers
in France, see Berger, II NwJ Intl L & Bus at 519-20 (cited in note 37).
59. September 28 Regulations art 3 (cited in note 38).
60. See William Dawkins, Small Interests Find Big Voice-France, Fin Times 4 (lune 20, 1991)
("Small Interests"); George Graham, Momentum for Growth-France, Fin Times 6 (June 28, 199 1);
George Graham, Turmoil in the French Business World, Fin Times 26 (June 17, 1991).
61. See Dawkins, Small Interests (cited in note 60); Berger, Nad L J (cited in note 39).
62. Similar issues have recently been raised in a number of French acquisitions, including the
acquisition of the leading French department store chain Nouvelles Galaries by its rival Galaries
Lafayette, and the bid by Accor the leading hotel group for Wagon Lits, the Franco-Belgian travel
group. For a more detailed discussion of these two transactions, see Berger, Natl LJ (cited in note
39) (analyzing the CVB's ruling in Nouvelles Galaries and the consequences of the decision);
Dawkins, Small Interests (cited in note 60) (reviewing the Wagon Lits deal).
63. See Berger, Natl LJ (cited in note 39) (discussing the CBV's ruling in Nouvelles Galaries).
64. Contrastingly, in Paribas' recent attempt to acquire Compagnie de Navigation Mixte
("Mixte"), Paribas complained about the parallel action taken by certain shareholders friendly to
Mixte, arguing that additional disclosure about these activities was necessary. In response, the
stockholders denied that they had an obligation to disclose their intentions because no written
agreement existed among them or with Mixte, a position which was subsequently upheld by the CBV.
See generally Steven Marquardt, Tender Offers in France: The New Rules, 1990 Int Fin L Rev 35, 36-37
(Jan 1990).
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practice of holding large equity positions in their clients, a trend that
increased in popularity with both the privatization drive and the rising French
stock market in the late 1980s. In addition, a number of French banks and
companies that are in the midst of large restructurings in an effort to
consolidate control and remove excess layers of holding companies will also
be affected. As such transactions increase in popularity, there is a
corresponding increase in the probability that there will be conflicts between
majority and minority shareholders seeking to invoke their new protections.
3. Post-Offer Defensive Maneuvers. A board is severely constrained in
adopting or implementing defensive measures after an offer has been made.
The COB must be notified in advance of all actions outside the scope of
ordinary business while an offer is pending, and such actions are generally
prohibited. The target board must consider shareholders' interests
paramount, and should demonstrate "particular prudence" in redeploying
65
assets or entering into other extraordinary corporate transactions.
A target board's ability to take defensive action is also increased by Law
89-531, which allows shareholders of a public company to give advance
authorization, within certain limits, to a board to issue new shares, even while
an offer is pending. 6 6 The most significant new provision allows a company to
issue new shares during a tender offer, without having to wait the normally
lengthy time periods necessary for approval of a capital increase. In this way,
a target board can potentially increase the cost of an unwanted offer by
increasing the number of shares outstanding, as well as possibly increasing
the shares owned by friendly shareholders. The usefulness of this provision
as a defensive maneuver is limited, since it circumscribes the board's ability to
waive preemptive rights with respect to the newly issued shares.
4. Future Trends. France is likely to remain one of the most active merger
and acquisition markets on the European continent, increasingly being viewed
as a guide for those EC countries attempting to develop a new takeover
system. France's new takeover regulatory system is particularly noteworthy
because, although statutorily based, it has not resulted in the significant
growth in "tactical" litigation that is a common feature in the U.S. takeover
system. The creation of a statutory system, which has opened up the French
market for takeovers, has not yet led to a litigation or financial explosion, and
has made France's system an intriguing model for other continental countries
seeking to develop their own regulatory systems, especially those countries
which lack the strong self-regulatory traditions that form the basis of the U.K.
system.
The French system has its critics. Perhaps most vocal are minority
shareholders, who have been the perceived victims in a number of recent
large French bids, including: Pinault's offer to purchase Au Printemps, the
65.
66.

Regulation 89-03 at art 3 (cited in note 38).
Law 89-531 at art 14 (cited in note 38).
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attempt by an Agnelli-controlled company to acquire Exor, and Accor's
acquisition of Wagon Lits. 67 In particular, minority shareholders have
focused on the rule that does not obligate a bidder to offer to buy all the
shares of a company until the fifty percent threshold is passed, in contrast to
the U.K. system in which a full bid is to
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(Aktiengesellschaft or "AG"), the most common form of business enterprise for
large German businesses, means that even a majority stockholder will have a
difficult time obtaining control over the company. Third, the role of the
banks in financing growth has resulted in the banks becoming substantial
investors in, and supporters of, management, as well as the fact that the banks
having greater control than their nominal share ownership would indicate, in
part because a bank representative often sits on the board of the company,
and because banks often are proxies for shareholders, with discretion to vote
the shares as the bank determines. Fourth, there is a relatively small base of
institutional investors who may be tempted by an offer at a premium. Finally,
various German legal principles deter large debt-financed transactions by, for
example, prohibiting an AG and, to a lesser degree, a limited liability
company (Gesel/schaft mit beschrankter Haftung or "GmbH") from pledging its
assets to finance, directly or indirectly, the purchase of its shares. 72 When
these factors are combined with a relatively lax corporate governance system
that allows disparate voting rights for shareholders, the German system can
look impregnable to a foreign investor.
This view is wrong. Acquisitions are occurring in Germany, and are likely
73
to increase in both size and frequency over the next several years.
Moreover, from a regulatory standpoint, the German market contains
virtually no limitations on even so-called "abusive" takeover tactics; indeed,
Germany does not even have laws prohibiting insider trading, nor is a single
regulatory agency responsible to oversee the market. 74 Thus, in many ways
Germany presents a unique opportunity for even unsolicited acquisitions.
A.

Pre-Bid Analysis and Disclosures Required Prior to the Offer

Obtaining basic financial information about a German target can be
difficult. While companies must publish financial statements and public
companies must publish additional information, including a semi-annual
financial report, small and medium-sized German companies, often the type
of company most likely to attract foreign interest, have only limited disclosure
obligations. Moreover, many of the disclosure obligations now in place result
from various EC directives. It is not clear what penalty, if any, will be imposed
75
for noncompliance or incomplete or inaccurate disclosures.
72. See German Public Stock Corporation Act § 57,
1 (Aktiengesetz or "Aktg") (1988). See also
Maximilian Schiessi, Leveraged Buyouts In Germany, 1991 Int Bus L 305; Eckart Wilcke, Germany, in
InternationalM&A: A Guide to the Regulation of Mergers andAcquisitions Worldwide, 1991 Int Fin L Rev 49.
73. For a view that the German takeover market is perhaps the most open European market, see
Hans-Jochen Otto, Obstacles to Foreigners Are Nothing But A Myth, Fin Times 15 (Feb 20, 1991).
74. Germany's failure to adopt laws prohibiting insider trading has resulted in much criticism of
the German stock markets, particularly in light of recent scandals involving alleged improprieties by
members of Dresdner Bank in the new issues market. See Katharine Campbell, German Stock Scam
Prompts Tighter Rules, Fin Times 3 (Sept 19, 1991); Sweeping'Out the Stables, The Economist, 15 (Aug 31,
1991). For a more detailed analysis of Germany's attitude toward insider trading, see Joseph Blum,
The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of Self-Restraint, 7 NwJ Int L & Bus 507 (1986).
75. See Coopers & Lybrand, Barriers at 10-15 (cited in note 5).
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In addition, the disclosures frequently must be made only to the
company's local Commercial Register, and although the information is then
available to the public, the lack of a "central" registry makes access to
company information more difficult than in the United States or United
76
Kingdom.
Equally scant disclosures are required of potential acquirors. Perhaps
most significantly, there is no disclosure provision comparable to those in the
U.K., French, and U.S. takeover codes, all of which require substantial
disclosures once an acquiror has purchased between three percent and five
percent of a company's equity. In contrast, disclosure of share ownership in
Germany is only required when a shareholder owns above twenty-five percent
77
of a company's voting stock or above fifty percent of its nominal capital.
Requiring disclosure only after this significant level of ownership is reached
may allow a bidder to gain a significant stake in the target prior to making or
78
announcing any offer.
Moreover, German law does not include the concept of "acting in concert"
or "beneficial ownership" when calculating ownership levels. 79 Because of
this, a bidder frequently can avoid violating provisions in a company's charter
or by-laws that prevent one entity from voting more than a set number of
shares regardless of its stock ownership. This situation occurred in both the
Flick brothers' bid for Feldmuhle Nobel AG and in Pirelli's recent effort to
acquire Continental.8 0 This type of toe-hold can, however, result in a sharp
increase in the share price of the target, particularly given the fact that there
are only approximately 500 publicly traded German companies, many of
which are either family controlled or controlled by a few dominant
shareholders. In fact, one knowledgeable source estimates that there are only
approximately thirty German companies that have a sufficiently dispersed
8
shareholder base to allow a hostile bid to be successful. '

76. Id.
77. Id at 10-23. See also West Germany, in A Practitioner'sGuide To European Takeover Regulation and
Practice 329-30 (Westminster Management Consultants, Ltd., 1990) ("West Germany").
78. Where disclosure is required, a shareholder may not exercise the rights of share ownership
until the disclosure has been made. This is, however, the only penalty for failing to comply with the
disclosure obligations.
79. Coopers & Lybrand, Barriers at 12-15 (cited in note 5); West Germany at 329-30 (cited in note
77).
80. In the Pirelli/Continental situation, for example, Continental's charter placed a five percent
ceiling on the voting rights of Continental shareholders, regardless of the number of shares owned
by a shareholder. To defeat this limitation, Pirelli and its advisers (principally Morgan Stanley,
Merrill Lynch, and Media Banca) created a shareholder pact, pursuant to which each member would
buy up to five percent of Continental's stock. As part of this agreement, Pirelli agreed to cover any
losses suffered by any of its allies as a result of their ownership of Continental stock, while the allies
agreed to vote with Pirelli to replace Continental's supervisory board, if necessary. See generally
Simonian, Fin Times (cited in note 70).
81. Wilcke, 1991 Intl Fin L Rev at 49 (cited in note 72).
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Structural Defense for Deterring an Offer

When considering an acquisition of a German company, the first issue a
non-German bidder must consider is how to structure the approach. This will
be determined, at least in part, by the structural defenses which the company
has in place. The most significant of these structural defenses are summarized
below.
1. Two-Tiered Boards. All AGs (as well as larger GmbHs) must have a twotiered board structure. Under this structure, day-to-day control over the
company rests with a management board (Vorstand). The members of the
management board are appointed by a separate, second-tier supervisory
board (Aufsichtsrat). Management board members are typically appointed for
five year terms, and cannot usually be removed prior to the completion of this
period except in the case of fraud or illness. Management board members
cannot be removed directly by shareholders, and are not voted upon by
shareholders, although some companies do provide that loss of shareholder
confidence can be cause for removal. The management board's duties are to
82
the corporation as a whole rather than to shareholders.
Members of the supervisory board are selected by shareholders and
employees. All AGs and any GmbH with more than 500 employees must seat
employee representatives in at least one-third of the places on the supervisory
board. Large companies (defined as those with more than 2000 employees)
must provide for equal representation of employee and shareholder
representatives. The chairperson of the supervisory board, who is elected by
shareholders, retains the ability to cast a "second" vote in the event of a tie
vote on any matter. A company may (and many German companies
frequently do) provide that removal of a supervisory board member requires a
super-majority vote of stockholders, and may also provide that particular
shareholders (or classes of stock) have the right to designate up to one-third
83
of the members of the supervisory board.
The two-tier board can be a significant deterrent to a bid in several ways.
First, it means that even a majority stockholder cannot immediately exercise
control, since a majority shareholder often cannot replace a majority of the
supervisory board, while management board members-the group who
actually runs the company on a daily basis-cannot be removed until the
expiration of their five-year term of office. Second, since many supervisory
boards allow for a removal of members only upon a vote of seventy-five
percent of the shareholders, an acquiror will often need to acquire more than
a simple majority of shares to even remove supervisory board members.
Finally, since management board members are largely insulated from
shareholders, the management board may (and frequently does) take action to
frustrate a bid that shareholders may wish to accept (or at least consider).
82.

See generally West Germany at 316-20 (cited in note 77).

83.

Id.
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2. Restricted Voting Rights. A second significant structural defense is the use
of restricted voting rights to limit the number of votes a single shareholder
may exercise. The by-laws of many German companies limit the number of
votes a single shareholder may exercise to five or ten percent of the
company's total voting rights. In addition, cross-shareholdings are fairly
common, although the German Stock Corporations Act limits the votes that
may be cast by an AG to twenty-five percent even if the holding in the other
enterprise in the AG exceeds twenty-five percent.
Recent events have indicated, however, that the lack of an "acting in
concert" principal may make restricted-voting rights less effective than had
previously been thought. For example, both Pirelli and the Flick brothers
avoided their targets' restricted voting limitations by arranging for groups of
friendly investors to make the acquisitions. These separate groups then
apparently agreed to vote their shares in accordance with the instructions of
the potential acquiror.
3. Super-Majority Requirements. AGs and GmbHs are both permitted to have
super-majority requirements in their articles. Such requirements can apply,
for example, to the removal of a supervisory board member, to the
amendment of the articles, or even to the acquisition or disposition of certain
assets. These provisions, particularly when coupled with restrictive voting
rights, may prevent even a majority stockholder from selecting the
supervisory board or changing the direction of a company.
4. Dependent Companies and Control Agreements. One of the most difficult
concepts for a U.S. or U.K. purchaser to understand when considering an
acquisition in Germany is the strict limitations placed on a majority or
controlling shareholder. For example, when an AG is controlled by a single
legal enterprise, the management board of the controlled AG must produce
an annual "dependency report" detailing any transactions between the
controlling and controlled enterprises, and confirming that the transactions,
taken as a whole, were fair. The auditors and supervisory board must confirm
the dependency report; a shareholder may obtain a court-ordered audit if the
dependency report is either not ratified or if the dependency report states that
unfair transactions occurred. These provisions can provide substantial
authority for limiting the effectiveness of a majority shareholder's control,
particularly to employee representatives on the supervisory board. 84
A dependency report may be avoided where the AG enters into a "control
agreement" with the controlling shareholder. A control agreement requires
the approval of seventy-five percent of the shareholders, and minority
shareholders must be given an opportunity to either sell their shares or
receive a guaranteed dividend, providing fair value, when a control agreement
is entered. While a control agreement allows the controlling shareholder to
bypass the supervisory board and give direct instructions to the management
84.

Id at 318-19.
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board, the controlling shareholder becomes jointly and severally liable for all
direct and contingent debt incurred during the term of the control agreement.
C.

Making, Accepting, or Rejecting an Offer

I Currently, no binding rules govern the takeover process in Germany. The
effective rules, which are voluntary guidelines, were promulgated in 1979 by
the Stock Exchange Committee of Experts, affiliated with the Federal Ministry
of Finance, and do not have the force of law, nor are they considered binding
upon those making an acquisition. In addition, Germany does not have a
single regulatory authority like the Takeover Panel in the United Kingdom,
France's CBV, or the SEC in the United States, with the ability to make rulings
or decisions in connection with a takeover. The guidelines apply only to AGs
or limited partnerships (Kommanditgesellschaft or "KGs") but not to GmbHs or
other commercial enterprises. 8 5
Besides being voluntary in nature, the guidelines are far less stringent than
those of the United Kingdom and France. For example, there are virtually no
restrictions on the offeror; partial offers are allowed, the offeror may continue
the offer for as long as it wishes and, if unsuccessful, may make another offer
at any time. In addition, no disclosure of any beneficial ownership is required;
the method of publication and disclosures made in the offer is largely left to
the discretion of the offeror, as the offer document does not have to be filed
with any regulatory agency.
Similarly, there are very few restrictions on the actions of the target board.
The target also does not have to provide the offeror with any information
concerning the company or its stockholders. Even if the bidder is a
shareholder, its rights to information under German law are limited. Finally,
German corporate culture can act as a barrier, since the view that
management should have a sense of responsibility for the company and its
employees often outweighs any sense on the part of management or
shareholders that shareholder value should be maximized. 8 6 In particular, the
management board of an AG does not owe a separate fiduciary duty to
shareholders, and German law does not provide for derivative shareholder
litigation. 8 7 Further, the concept of shareholder rights or a board acting in
the interests of the shareholders, as opposed to the company and its
stakeholders as a whole, is foreign to the German market. This lack of a
philosophical basis to support maximizing shareholder value allows both
85. For an English translation and summary of the guidelines, see Coopers & Lybrand, Barniers
(cited in note 5).
86. This attitude can even be seen where the target company determines that a sale of the
enterprise is inevitable. For example, when Maxwell Communications Corporation made a contested
bid for Bibliographische Institute and FA Brockhaus AG ("BIFAB"), a principal argument that
BIFAB made was that MCC would not be a suitable employer of BIFAB's workers.
87. The only provision allowing derivative-type actions is § 147 of the Stock Corporation Act,
which permits holders of ten percent or more of an AG's voting shares to demand a damage action
be brought by and on behalf of the company against members of the management and/or
supervisory boards whose acts have injured the company. Aktg § 147 (cited in note 72).
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management and supervisory boards to take a variety of steps to defeat an
unwanted bid.
D.

Future Trends

The German economic system fundamentally rejects the use of takeovers
as a method for restructuring corporations. Instead, the German system
relies upon the close monitoring of corporations by banks and others (for
example, creditors, employees) with a direct economic interest in the affairs of
the corporation. As a result, Germany has developed neither an active
takeover market nor a reliable system for regulatory control over corporate
transactions.
The structural barriers to takeovers in Germany have also raised the most
serious impediments to foreign acquisition of any of the larger EC countries.
As described above, the barriers to hostile bids are formidable, and even
consensual transactions are difficult, particularly given the historical
reluctance of many corporate officers to sell a business to a non-German
entity.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, foreign acquisitions of
German companies can be expected to increase over the next several years. A
primary reason for this expected increase is economic: many German
businesses, particularly Gmbhs, are still family-owned, with strong cash flow
and asset values. The founder, who typically formed the company shortly
after World War II, is now ready to retire and no obvious successor is
available. Under such circumstances, a sale of the company makes a great
deal of financial sense. In addition, the development of the former East
Germany and the privatization of many formerly state-run companies have led
to a dramatic increase in the number of potential acquisition candidates.
Third, there appears to be a trend towards using equity financing in Germany,
and this practice could lead to an increase in the number of companies that
may be acquired, even on a hostile basis.
V
CONCLUSION

This article has briefly analyzed the existing takeover regulations in the
three largest EC economies. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany are
also the three countries that have taken the lead in developing (and
criticizing) the EC's proposed Takeover Directive, and that can be expected to
have the most significant impact upon any Takeover Directive ultimately
adopted by the EC. Finally, these three countries also have the largest stock
exchanges in the EC, and all are currently attempting to establish theirs as the
dominant exchange.
There are several important lessons which can be learned from an analysis
of the takeover regulations in these three countries: First, even if the EC

adopts a uniform takeover directive applicable to all its member-states, there
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will still remain practices that may inhibit the acquisition process. As can be
seen from the example of France, imposing a comprehensive takeover regime
on a system which has historically had substantial barriers to acquisitions does
not create a barrier-free system.
Second, the existence of cultural and political factors unique to a
particular country will continue to play an important role in the acquisition
process. For example, using a German bank when attempting to make an
acquisition in Germany may not only expedite the substantive negotiations,
but may also simplify the process of identifying a target and obtaining
relevant financial information.
Finally, an understanding of national regulations can often provide an
explanation for behavior that seems illogical to a U.S. acquiror. Thus, the
reluctance by a British target to provide complete disclosure in a friendly
transaction is understandable when it is recognized that the target must then
provide the same information to any potential bidder, including competitors.
In sum, U.S. companies can make acquisitions in the EC, even hostile bids.
But such transactions must take into account the very different historical and
cultural forces that exist in each EC country. Further, when considering how
EC regulation is likely to develop in the near future, it is important to focus on
the individual positions of the member states, not just the institutional
concerns of the various legislative branches of the EC. Finally, it is worth
noting the increasing consensus, even in such countries as Germany and the
Netherlands, about the need for increased regulation of corporate activity and
opening domestic markets. These factors should lead to continued growth in
EC takeovers, both domestically and on a cross-border basis.

